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SPECIAL PRACTICE ACT
THE SPECIAL PRACTICE ACT IN TEXAS
A. E. Collier*
N 1923 the Texas Legislature enacted the Special Practice Act
to govern certain aspects of procedure in the district courts of
a few populous counties.' Gradually, through the combination of
a broadening of the requirements for operation of the Act and
the trend toward continuous terms within most of the smaller
counties, it is now applicable to the district courts in more than
85 per cent of the 254 counties in Texas.2 As a result of discussion
and correspondence, it is believed that some members of the Bar
do not realize that the Special Practice Act is no longer "special."
This article is written to furnish a guide in determining the
counties in which it operates and to consider the effects of some
of its more important provisions.
HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE SPECIAL PRACTICE ACT
When the Special Practice Act was originally enacted in 1923,
its purpose was to expedite litigation in the more populous cen-
ters.8 The heavy litigation in urban areas made it necessary to
provide that the district courts be always in session, but in making
this provision the Legislature had to take into account the consti-
tutional requirement that every district court should have at least
*B.B.A., LL.B., Southern Methodist University; Editor-in-Chief, Southwestern Law
Journal, 1951-1952. The writer has had the benefit of special help and supervision from
Professor Wilmer D. Masterson, Jr., of the Southern Methodist University Law School
faculty.
1 Acts 1923, 38th Leg., c. 105, § 1. The "Special Practice Act" is the popular name
by which the Act is referred to by both bench and bar. Fitzgerald v. Lane, 137 Tex. 514,
155 S.W. 2d 602 (1941).
2 See Appendix infra p. 223.
3 "The purpose of the enactment was to adjust the practice and procedure in the
civil district courts of certain of the populous counties to dispose of their continuous
litigation, without interfering in any way with the practice and procedure of the other
courts of the state." Walker Avenue Realty Co. v. Alaskan Fur Co., 123 S. W. 2d 999,
1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
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two terms in each year.4 This necessity led to the adoption of terms
of court lasting as long as three to six months instead of the
generally shorter terms in use in other counties throughout the
state. The fact that judgments rendered during the early part of
one of these longer terms remained subject to the control of the
court until the end of the term prevented such judgments from
having the desired element of finality. The Special Practice Act
was adopted to meet this problem. It did so by providing for fixed
periods during which various steps affecting a judgment could be
taken and by prescribing a period after which a judgment would be
as final as if the term of court had ended. The constitutionality of
the Act was upheld in Phil H. Pierce Co. v. Watkins,5 decided
in 1924.
When first enacted, the Act was embodied in Articles 2092 and
2093 of Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1925) and was
applicable to "civil district courts in counties having two or more
district courts with civil jurisdiction only, whose terms continue
for three months or longer."6 This provision limited the applica-
tion of the Act to the counties of Harris, Dallas, and Tarrant. In
1929 Jefferson County was brought within the scope of the Act;'
Article 2093a was enacted in 1935 to place Wichita County within
portions of its operation;8 and in 1939 Article 2092 was amended
to broaden the scope of the Act to include Bexar County.9
4 TEx. CONST. Art. 5, § 7.
6 114 Tex. 153, 158, 263 S. W. 905, 907 (1924). "The law is a valid exercise of leg-
islative authority, and well designed to have a wholesome effect upon the dispatch and
finality of litigation in the courts in our congested centers."
6 Acts 1923, 38th Leg., c. 105, § 1; TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 2092.
Acts 1929, 41st Leg. 2d C. S., c. 84, p. 166.
8 Acts 1935, 44th Leg., c. 105, p. 289.
9 Acts 1939, 46th Leg., c. 28, p. 205, § 1, provides that the Act shall apply "in the
Civil District Courts in counties having two (2) or more District Courts with civil
jurisdiction only, whose terms continue three months or longer and in all civil litiga-
tion in counties having five (5) or more District Courts with either civil or criminal
jurisdiction or both civil and criminal jurisdiction." The latter portion apparently had
the effect of placing all civil litigation, including that in the county and justice courts,
under the Act in the most populous counties. No cases have been found so applying
this provision. Since the adoption of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, this
provision is no longer in effect.
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When the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted to take
effect in 1941, the Special Practice Act was embodied in Rule
330.10 The Rule provided that it should "govern and be followed
in all civil actions in district courts in counties where the only
district court of said county vested with civil jurisdiction, or all
the district courts thereof having civil jurisdiction, have successive
terms in said county throughout the year, without more than two
days intervening between any of such terms, whether or not any
one or more of such district courts include one or more other
counties within its jurisdiction." The primary requirement of this
Rule was that all the civil district courts in the county have con-
tinuous terms. It was adopted with the view that there would
eventually be continuous terms in all districts."
The following year there began a statewide campaign to intro-
duce continuous terms in counties which had not previously had
them. One of the leading exponents of continuous terms was James
P. Alexander, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas.
In an article in the Texas Bar Journal he pointed out the advan-
tages of continuous terms and prescribed a procedure for intro-
ducing them into any particular county.' 2 A State Bar committee
sponsoring the plan decided that the best way to foster its growth
would be by a series of local bills for districts favoring continuous
terms rather than by one general bill.'" The Committee on Legisla-
tion prepared a uniform "Continuous Term" bill for use in enact-
ing the local bills. It was agreed that the state should be divided
into various sections and that each member of the Committee
should contact the judges and lawyers in each area, urging them
to take steps to procure the passage of a "Continuous Term" act
for their district courts. Each district judge and lawyer was to be
10 TEx. RULES CIV. PROC. (VERNON, 1942) Rule 330, adopted by the Supreme Court
of Texas to take effect September 1, 1941. Future references to these rules will be
simply by rule number.
11 James P. Alexander, Continuous Terms, 5 Tex. B. J. 43 (1942).
12 Ibid.
Is 5 Tex. B. J. 264 (1942).
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furnished with a copy of the uniform "Continuous Term" bill."
After receiving the approval of the local bar within each of the
counties affected and that of the. district judges concerned, the
bills were introduced into the legislature and were passed without
opposition. During the 1943 session, bills providing for contin-
uous terms for 41 district courts encompassing 149 counties were
enacted. Additional counties have been added to the list in each
of the sessions of the legislature since then, so that today only
36 counties out of 254 do not have completely continuous terms.
The result of this drive has been a significant increase in the
number of counties subject to the Special Practice Act. Coupled
with this increase has been a growth in the amount of litigation
reaching the appellate courts construing and applying the Act.
From the reports of this litigation, it is possible now to outline
pretty definitely most of the effects of the Act. It is the purpose
of this article to examine the decisions to determine, to the extent
that it is possible, the counties in which the Act is effective today
and to discuss some of the problems that have arisen under its
operation.
COUNTIES IN WHICH THE SPECIAL PRACTICE ACT Is APPLICABLE
Rule 330 provides that the Special Practice Act "shall govern
and be followed in all civil actions in district courts in counties
where the only district court of said county vested with civil juris-
diction, or all the district courts thereof having civil jurisdiction,
have successive terms in said county throughout the year, without
more than two days intervening between any of such terms,
whether or not any one or more of such district courts include
one or more other counties within its jurisdiction." Analysis of
this provision justifies the following observations:
(1) The Special Practice Act applies only to civil district
courts. It does not affect criminal courts, nor does it operate in the
county or justice courts.
,4 6 Tex. B. J. 208 (1943).
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(2) For the Special Practice Act to operate, the court must
have "continuous terms"-successive terms throughout the year
without more than two days intervening between any of such
terms.' 5
(3) Where a particular county has more than one civil district
court, in order for the Special Practice Act to operate, all of them
must have continuous terms. If one of the courts does not have
continuous terms, then all the courts operate under the general
practice. 6 This feature makes it convenient to classify the courts
which operate under the Act by counties.
(4) It is possible for a particular district court to operate under
the Special Practice Act in one or more counties, and under the
general practice in other counties. 7
It is apparent that whether a particular district court operates
under the Special Practice Act within a particular county depends
upon whether all the courts within the county have continuous
terms while sitting within that county. To make this determina-
tion, it is necessary to resort to Article 199 of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948). This article sets out the terms of
court for all the civil district courts in each of the counties in
which they operate. Looking to Article 199, if the district court
in question has continuous terms in the county involved and all
the other district courts within that county also have continuous
terms, then it operates under the Special Practice Act.
Unfortunately, there are at least twenty different variations em-
ployed in setting out the terms of court for the different districts.
Some of these provisions have been interpreted by the courts;
others have not. The provisions which have been construed as
15 The determination of when a court has continuous terms is sometimes difficult.
See discussion infra at pp. 198-203.
16 Delta and Hunt Counties offer an example of this feature. The 62d District Court
has continuous terms in these counties, but the 8th District Court does not. Conse-
quently, both courts operate under the general practice.
17 An example of this feature is found in the 112th District Court, which operates
under the Special Practice Act in the continuous term counties of Kimble, Sutton
and Crockett, but under the general practice in Pecos and Upton Counties.
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providing for continuous terms may be conveniently divided into
three groups:
(1) Those which provide that each term of court shall continue
until the date fixed for the beginning of the next term, or until
some other date less than two days prior to the beginning of the
next term.
(2) Those which provide that each term of court may continue
until the date fixed for the beginning of the next term, or until
some other date less than two days prior to the beginning of the
next term.
(3) Those which provide that each term of court shall or may
continue until all the business is disposed of.
Within the first group there seems to be no doubt that the pro-
vision is one for continuous terms. The mandatory character of
the language employed is sufficient to make it a provision for
"successive terms.., throughout the year, without more than two
days intervening between any of such terms." This group includes
such populous counties as Harris, Dallas, Bexar and Nueces.
The second group is the largest in number of counties involved.
The language most often used to designate continuous terms is that
which was recommended in the "Uniform Continuous Terms" bill
sponsored by the State Bar. The first case to construe this provi-
sion was Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Bailey,"s a case ap-
pealed from the district court of Kaufman County. Article 199
provides that "each term of court in... [Kaufman County] may
continue until the date herein fixed for the beginning of the next
succeeding term therein." The court held that Kaufman County
was controlled by the Special Practice Act. No discussion of the
question was given, the court merely saying, "Without discussing
the question in extenso, we express the conclusion that the statute
had the effect of placing Kaufman County under the practice and
procedure described in Rule 330. ...""
IS 175 S. W. 2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) er. ref. w. o. m.
19 Id. at 619.
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In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Klingeman" the argument was
made that inasmuch as Article 199 provides that the terms of court
"may" continue until the next term begins, and since under
Rule 19 the court is at liberty to adjourn such terms more than
two days before the next term begins,"' the Special Practice Act
does not apply. The court answered this argument by noting that
the same contention had been made in a prior case22 and had been
overruled and observed that it saw no reason to conflict with that
decision.
The only supreme court decision within this group is W. C.
Turnbow Petroleum Corp. v. Fulton,'2 which held that Upshur
County has continuous terms. No discussion of the provision was
given in the opinion. This supreme court holding coupled with the
denial of the argument made in the Klingeman case indicate that
the provisions within this group are clearly continuous terms pro-
visions.
The distinguishing feature of the third group of counties is the
provision for continuation of the terms of court until all the busi-
ness is disposed of. In Wichita Falls & S. R. Co. v. McDonald21
the supreme court considered the question whether Rule 330 ap-
plied to Tarrant County. Article 199 provides:
The terms of said district courts shall be as follows:
Forty-eighth District: On the first Mondays in February, May,
August and November and continue until the business is disposed of.
In holding that this subdivision is a provision for continuous terms,
the court said:
20242 S. W. 2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref.
21 Rule 19 provides: "Every term of court shall commence and convene by opera-
tion of law at the time fixed by statute without any act, order, or formal opening by a
judge or other official thereof, and shall continue to be open at all times until and
including the last day of the term unless sooner adjourned by the judge thereof." (Em-
phasis supplied.)
22 National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Collins, 224 S. W. 2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949) er. ref., discussed infra at note 26.
23 145 Tex. 56, 194 S. W. 2d 256 (1946).
24 141 Tex. 555, 174 S. W. 2d 951 (1943).
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All the civil courts of... [Tarrant] county have successive terms
throughout the year, with not more than two days intervening be-
tween any of such terms, and consequently the procedure therein is
subject to the provisions of Rule 330, Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.25
No mention was made of the possibility that the business of one
term might be disposed of before the date set for the beginning
of the next term.
In National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Collins2" the court con-
sidered the provision for terms of court for the 91st District Court
of Eastland County. Article 199 provides that the terms of that
court shall be held "[o]n the first Mondays in February, April,
June, August, October and December, and may continue until the
business of the court is disposed of." Citing the provisions of
Rule 19, the appellants contended that "if the business of the
court is disposed of prior to the expiration of any two months
term ... the judge may adjourn court for the term before the
expiration of two months and therefore, R.C.P. 330 does not
apply ... ."27 The court did not offer a logical answer to this
argument. It merely noted that the material provisions as to
terms of the district courts in Tarrant and Eastland Counties are
identical and relied upon the McDonald case to hold that Rule 330
is applicable to the district courts of Eastland County.
The most recent case construing this provision is Bunte v.
Flett,25 which held that the district courts of Galveston County are
governed by Rule 330. Article 199 provides that the terms of the
district courts of Galveston County shall begin "[o]n the first
Monday in February, April, June, October and December and
may continue until the business is disposed of." The court of civil
appeals certified the question: "Do the provisions of Rule 330,
T.R.C.P. govern the practice and procedure in the 56th District
25 Id. at 556, 174 S. W. 2d at 952.
26 Cited supra note 22.
27 224 S. W. 2d at 286.
28 - -------. Tex -........ 243 S. W. 2d 828 (1951).
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Court of Galveston County, Texas?" In answering this question
affirmatively, the supreme court relied upon and expressed its
approval of the Collins case. In noting that the June term could
last four months, whereas the other four terms were for only two
months, the court said:
The result merely is to have four terms limited to two months and
one (June) limited to four months, with all of them permitted to
continue until the business is disposed of. They are successive terms
and... they are terms "without more than two days intervening be-
tween any of them," because the court's business may require that
the terms run for the full two months or four months, as the case
may be. 29
The decisions reviewed have established definitely that district
courts in the counties involved and those having identical provi-
sions for terms of court have continuous terms. But what about
those counties with similar provisions for which we have no con-
trolling decisions? May we derive any guiding principles from
the decisions which have been discussed?
At the outset, it should be noted that these decisions ap-
parently make no attempt to discover whether the courts actually
have been in session "for successive terms without more than two
days intervening between any of such terms." They merely look
to the provisions of Article 199 and decide whether the provision
in question is one for continuous terms. Apparently the fact that
Rule 19 is subject to the construction that the trial judge may
adjourn the term prior to the date at which it would expire by
operation of law is not sufficient to take the court out of the pro-
visions of Rule 330. This contention was made and overruled in
the Collins case, which has received the support of the supreme
court in Bunte v. Flett. Whether the courts would hold the Special
Practice Act applicable in a case in which the trial court actually
adjourned the term more than two days before the date set for the
beginning of the next term is unknown.
29 243 S. W. 2d at 829.
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The language of the Bunte case seems to indicate that a court
has continuous terms if by the provisions of Article 199 each term
of court is permitted to continue until the date set for the begin-
ning of the next term. In its opinion the supreme court noted that
the terms in question were successive terms "because the court's
business may require that the terms run for the full two months
or four months, as the case may be."80 If this analysis is a correct
one, then it will not matter whether the term is actually adjourned
more than two days before the date set for the beginning of the
next term.81
Let us consider the effect of such an interpretation upon several
provisions of Article 199 which have not yet been ruled upon by
the courts. Article 199 provides for three terms of court beginning
at four-month intervals for the 123rd District Court in Panola and
Shelby Counties. It further provides that the terms shall continue
in session for seven and eight weeks respectively, "or until the
business thereof is disposed of." Four terms of twelve weeks each
are prescribed for the 13th District Court of Navarro County, but
there is also added the phrase, "or until all the business be dis-
posed of." Both of these subdivisions of Article 199 contain pro-
visions for fixed terms which standing alone would not be contin-
uous terms. Does the addition of the phrase, "or until the business
be disposed of," alter this situation and make the terms contin-
uous? This phrase standing alone has been held to amount to a
continuous term provision since "the court's business may require
that the term run ... [until the beginning of the next term] ."32 The
same reasoning should be applicable to the subdivisions of Article
199 under consideration. Such an interpretation would render the
district courts of Panola, Shelby and Navarro Counties subject to
the provisions of the Special Practice Act.
3o Ibid. Emphasis supplied.
31 No cases have been found in which a court subject to the Special Practice Act
has actually adjourned more than two days before the date set for the beginning of
the next term. Such a case would present interesting problems in connection with the
filing of motions for new trial.
32 Bunte v. Flett, Tex.. 243 S. W. 2d 828, 829 (1951).
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A similar situation is found in the provisions for terms of the
62nd District Court in Delta, Hunt, Lamar and Franklin Counties.
Since the 8th District Court in Delta and Hunt Counties does not
have continuous terms, both courts operate under the general prac-
tice in these two counties. Article 199 provides for two terms of
eight weeks each in Lamar County and for two terms of three
weeks each in Franklin County. Standing alone, these provisions
would clearly make both counties subject to the general practice.
But in a subsequent paragraph there is the following provision:
"Each term of court in each of such counties may continue until the
date herein fixed for the beginning of the next succeeding term
therein." The addition of this sentence would seem to permit con-
tinuous terms, so that under the test laid down in the Bunte case,
both counties should operate under the Special Practice Act.
The tendency of the courts to resolve all doubts in favor of a
holding that a particular provision is for continuous terms would
seem to justify a prediction that Panola, Shelby, Navarro, Lamar
and Franklin Counties will all be held to be within the Special
Practice Act.
THE SPECIAL PRACTICE ACT IN OPERATION
Before 1941, the Special Practice Act was embodied in Articles
2092 and 2093 of Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1925)
and contained 31 different subdivisions. When the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure were enacted, some of these subdivisions were
put into general operation, others were discarded, and still others
were embodied in Rules 330 and 331, the present Special Prac-
tice Act. Rule 330 contains 10 subdivisions, but this article is
limited to a discussion of subdivisions (j), (k) and (1). The other
provisions are largely directory, and very little litigation arises
under them.
(1) SIGNIFICANCE OF TERM TIME
One of the outstanding features of the operation of the Special
Practice Act is the manner in which the significance usually at-
1952]
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tached to the expiration of terms of court is reduced. As indicated
previously, one of the requirements for operation under the Act is
that the court have continuous terms-terms without more than
two days intervening between any of the terms of court. This
factor of continuity makes it possible in large measure to ignore
the existence of terms of court.
Expiration of term. Under the general practice, if a trial is in
process at the end of a term, the expiration of the term causes
the court to lose power over the trial, and past trial proceedings
become a nullity. 3 When the trial is resumed at a subsequent term,
the entire trial must be started over again. Under the Special
Practice Act, Rule 330 (j) makes it possible for a trial begun
in one term to be completed during the following term. It provides
in part:
If a case or other matter is on trial or in process of hearing when
the term of court expires, such trial, hearing or other matter may be
proceeded with at the next term of court. No motion for new trial
or other motion or plea shall be considered as waived or overruled,
because not acted on at the term of court at which it was filed, but
may be acted on at the succeeding term or at any time which the
judge may fix or to which it may have been postponed or continued
by agreement of the parties with leave of the court.
Under this provision no extension of term is required in order to
continue the proceedings during the subsequent term. The trial
may be continued just as though the term had not expired at all. 4
However, even under the Special Practice Act, an order entered
after the expiration of one term but before the beginning of the
next is not a valid order, since the court has no power to act. 5
In this connection a word of caution is required when the trial
is still not completed by the end of the second term. Consider a
38 Ordinarily this result may be avoided in district courts by extension of the term
under the provisions of Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. (VERNON, 1948) art. 200a or 1923.
34 Scott v. Gardner, 159 S. W. 2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) er. rel. w. o. m.; Shell.
hammer v. Caruthers, 99 S. W. 2d 1054 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) er. dism.; Miller v. Babbs
& Hall, 62 S. W. 2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) er. dism.
35 Talkington v. Talkington, 266 S. W. 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
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situation in which a particular court has terms beginning on the
first Mondays in January, April, July and October. A trial is
begun during the January term, but is not completed by the end
of the term. Proceedings are continued during the April term
under the authority of the quoted provision of Rule 330 (j). If
the trial is still not completed at the end of of the April term,
may proceedings be continued during the July term? In British
General Ins. Co. v. Ripy,36 the commission of appeals in an
opinion adopted by the supreme court held that Rule 330 (j) gives
authority to proceed only during the term immediately following
that at which the trial was begun and that the only way to con-
tinue the trial thereafter is by extension of the term.
It is arguable that this decision is not a proper construction of
Rule 330 (j). That rule provides: "If a case or other matter is
on trial or in process of hearing when the term of court expires,
such trial, hearing or other matter may be proceeded with at the
next term of court." Certainly when the second term expires, the
case is still "on trial or in process of hearing" so that Rule 330
(j) should authorize proceeding with the trial at the next or third
term of court.
Under the general practice, if a verdict has been reached in the
trial and the term expires before judgment is rendered, judgment
may be rendered nunc pro tune at a subsequent term, "where the
delay in rendition after the case is fully ripe for judgment has
resulted solely from the process of the law or the delay of the
court, and not from any fault of the prevailing party."8 7 Under
the Special Practice Act, rendition of judgment nunc pro tunc is
not required, and the court has power under Rule 330 (j) to
render judgment at the term immediately subsequent to that at
36 130 Tex. 101, 106 S. W. 2d 1047 (1937).
37 4 McDONALD, TExAS CIVIL PRACTICE (1950) 1325 and cases cited therein. McDon-
ald indicates that, since old Rule 66 requiring rendition of judgment during the term at
which the case was tried was not carried into the new rules, the court may have inher-
ent power to render judgment at a subsequent term. But he says that "until the effect
of the change is authoritatively declared, it may be advisable to comply with the pro-




which the trial was begun. If the Ripy case is sound, then a judg-
ment nunc pro tunc is probably necessary when a trial starts in
one term, a verdict is returned in the second, and judgment is
rendered after expiration of the second term.
Under the general practice, if a motion for new trial is not
decided during the term at which it is filed, the motion is over-
ruled by operation of law when the term expires. Under the Spe-
cial Practice Act, Rule 330 (j) provides: "A motion for new trial
filed during one term of court may be heard and acted on at the
next term of court." As a result of this provision, the expiration
of the term has no effect upon a motion for new trial. Under the
Ripy case, apparently a motion for new trial filed in a term
subsequent to that in which the trial was begun would be over-
ruled if it had not been acted upon at the expiration of the second
term. A subsequent section deals with the problem of when a
motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law.
District courts have power to extend a term in an appropriate
case under either of two statutes." Does the fact that a district
court operates under the Special Practice Act affect this power? In
Jones v. Campbell 9 the court said that when a court operates
under the Special Practice Act "no necessity could arise for the
extension of any term of... court."4 The court said that "any un-
finished matter pending before the court may be carried over to
and the hearing thereof postponed to some day certain."'" It is
believed that this reasoning is consistent with the language of
Rule 330 (j). However, if the Ripy case is sound, necessity for
extension of the term subsequent to that at which the trial begins
may be necessary if the proceedings are not yet completed by the
end of such subsequent term. That such extension would be re-
quired is recognized expressly by the court in the Ripy case.
Finality of judgments. The term "final judgment" has been used
38 TEX. REV. CiM. STAT. (VERNON, 1948) arts. 200a and 1923.
39 188 S. W. 2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) er. ref.




with several different meanings by the courts.42 In this section the
term is used to refer to the situation wherein a judgment, which
has effectively taken the cause from the trial court's docket, and
which has determined the merits with sufficient certainty to support
an appeal, is nevertheless within the control of the trial court,
which may modify it upon direct proceedings in the same cause
or upon its own motion. Attention will be directed to determining
when such a judgment becomes "final"-i.e., when the trial court
loses power to modify or set aside the judgment by proceedings
in the same cause.
Under the general practice, a judgment becomes "final" at the
end of the term. Until the term ends, the trial court has power to
modify the judgment or to set it aside and grant a new trial. Be-
cause the terms of court in the populous counties are generally
three to six months long, the Special Practice Act contains a provi-
sion making the judgment "final" at a fixed time without reference
to the expiration of the term. Rule 330 (1) provides: "Judg-
ments of such civil district courts shall become as final after the
expiration of 30 days after the date of judgment or after a motion
for a new trial is overruled as if the term of court had expired."43
Under this provision, after expiration of the prescribed thirty-day
period, the judgment becomes as final as if the term of court had
expired. In the language of Dallas Storage & Warehouse Co. v.
Taylor, "the term is as to the case at an end ... , After this
period has expired and the judgment has become "final," the trial
court no longer has the power to grant a new trial in the cause and
an order which thereafter purports to grant a new trial is a
nullity 4
5
Rule 330 (1) provides for measurement of the thirty-day period
42 4 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE (1950) § 17.03.
43' "This provision of the statute was necessary in order to prevent an unreasonable
delay to a litigant in reaping the fruits of his victory in a suit won by him in a court
the term of which extends for six months...." Fox v. First Nat. Bank of Houston, 23
S. W. 2d 888, 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), rev'd, 121 Tex. 7, 39 S. W. 2d 1085 (1931).
44 124 Tex. 315, 321, 77 S. W. 2d 1031 ,1034 (1934).
46 Bridgman v. Moore, 143 Tex. 250, 183 S. W. 2d 705 (1944).
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either from the date of judgment or from the date a motion for
new trial is overruled. If there is no motion for new trial, then
the judgment becomes final 30 days after the date of the judg-
ment. Rule 306a provides that the date of judgment "shall be
deemed to be the date upon which the written draft thereof was
signed by the trial judge as stated therein" and that "[i]n event
the date of signing of a judgment is not shown therein. . ., then the
date of rendition shall be otherwise shown of record." If the
judgment is rendered nunc pro tunc, the 30-day period is meas-
ured from the date of the nunc pro tunc judgment. 46
When a motion for new trial is duly filed, then the judgment
becomes "final" thirty days after the motion for new trial is over-
ruled, whether by order of the court or by operation of law. This
result is reached even in those cases in which a motion for new
trial is not required as a prerequisite to appeal.47
Ordinarily the ruling of the court on an interlocutory matter
made at one term may be set aside or altered at a subsequent
term of court, provided the case has not been previously disposed
of on the merits. The fact that the court is operating under the
Special Practice Act does not change this result.4 But a ruling
on a plea of privilege, though interlocutory, is final insofar as it
disposes of the issue of venue. Under the Special Practice Act,
following a hearing on a plea of privilege, the ruling on the plea
of privilege becomes "final" thirty days after the date of the inter-
locutory judgment.49 No motion for new trial is allowed from an
interlocutory order.50
46 Rule 306b.
47 Neely v. Tarrant County, 132 Tex. 357, 124 S. W. 2d 101 (1939); Kilian v.
Kilian, 185 S. W. 2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). But see Wichita Falls & S. R. Co.
v. McDonald, 141 Tex. 555, 174 S. W. 2d 951 (1943), in which the court held that
no motion for new trial could be filed after an interlocutory order entered after hearing
on a plea of privilege, citing Rule 385.
48 Hudler v. Hudler, 229 S. W. 2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
49 Wichita Falls & S. R. Co. v. McDonald, 141 Tex. 555, 174 S. W. 2d 951 (1943).
-5o Rule 385; Wichita Falls & S. R. Co. v. McDonald, supra note 49.
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(2) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Since the enactment of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the
motion for new trial has become *of increasing importance. In most
cases it is a prerequisite to appeal." Times for filing the appeal
bond and the transcript and statement of facts are measured from
the rendition of judgment or the overruling of a motion for new
trial, whichever comes later.52 Those requirements of the Special
Practice Act which govern the filing of motions for new trials
should be carefully observed, since the right of appeal may be
jeopardized by a failure to meet them.
Before entering upon a detailed discussion of these provisions,
attention should be directed to the landmark case in this field,
Dallas Storage and Warehouse Co. v. Taylor,58 decided by the
Supreme Court of Texas in 1934. Prior to the decision in this
case and its companion cases, the supreme court had held that the
provisions of the Special Practice Act with respect to the amend-
ment of motions for new trial and the presentation and ruling on
such motions were directory rather than mandatory.54 In an
amendment to the Special Practice Act in 1930, the Legislature
stated that the fact that the court in these cases had construed the
provisions to be directory created an emergency necessitating
amendment of the statute.55 With this background, the court in the
Taylor case held that the provisions were no longer directory, but
were mandatory. In making its decision, the court took occasion
to list in detail the effect of the provisions of the Special Practice
Act upon the filing, amendment, presentation and decision of
motions for new trial. The principles set out in this decision
together with those in two companion cases have served as a guide
51 Rule 324.
52 Rules 356 and 386.
53 124 Tex. 315, 77 S. W. 2d 1031 (1934).
54 Nevitt v. Wilson, 116 Tex. 29, 285 S. W. 1079 (1926) ; Diamond Ice & Cold Stor-
age Co. v. Strube, 115 Tex. 515, 284 S. W. 935 (1926) ; Townes v. Lattimore, 114 Tex.
511, 272 S. W. 435 (1925).
5 Acts 1930, 41st Leg. 5th C. S., c. 70, § 1, p. 227.
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for later cases in this field, and have been followed almost without
exception."'
Filing. Under the general practice, the motion for new trial
must be filed within two days after the rendition of judgment.57
After the expiration of this two-day period, the trial court may
alter, modify or set aside the judgment in the exercise of its
inherent power during term time, but may not extend the period
for filing a motion for new trial.5" A motion filed after the expira-
tion of the term in which the judgment is rendered is a nullity.59
Under the Special Practice Act, the period for filing a motion
for new trial is governed by Rule 330 (k), which provides that
"a motion for new trial where required shall be filed within ten
(10) days after the judgment is rendered or other order com-
plained of is rendered ..... "Thus, within ten days following rendi-
tion of the judgment, either party may file a motion for new trial
as a matter of right. One effect of filing a motion for new trial
is to extend automatically the period during which the trial court
has power over the judgment and the period for filing an appeal
bond, since these periods will thereafter be measured from the
date the motion for new trial is overruled. This extension results
even when the motion is filed in a suit in which no motion for new
trial is required as a prerequisite to appeal.
61
What is the result if no motion for new trial is filed during the
ten-day period following judgment, but one is filed during the
30-day period before the judgment becomes "final"? Since the
court still has control over the judgment, it clearly has the power
to set it aside and grant a new trial."' If the court grants permis-
sion to file such a belated motion, but then overrules it, does the
motion have any effect? In considering this point, the supreme
56 Anyone beginning a study of the Special Practice Act would do well to use the
rules laid down in headnotes I through 8 in 77 S. W. 2d at 1034 as a starting point.
57 Rule 320.
ts A. F. Jones & Sons v. Republic Supply Co., ----- Tex -......... , 246 S. W. 2d
853 (1952).
59 Green v. Green, 288 S. W. 406 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
60 Cases cited supra note 47.
61 Dallas Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Taylor, 124 Tex. 315, 77 S. W. 2d 1031 (1934).
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court in the Taylor case held that "the court may in its discretion,
within such 30-day period [after judgment], entertain a motion
filed after the 10 days but within the 30 days, and if it does so and
overrules it, the judgment does not become final until the expira-
tion of 30 days from the time the motion was overruled."62 Fol-
lowing this holding, later cases have held that the time for filing
the appeal bond is dated from the date the belated motion is over-
ruled.6
Since the decision in the Taylor case, Rule 5 has been adopted,
providing that the trial court "may not enlarge the periods for
taking any action under the rules relating to new trials... except
as stated in the rules relating thereto." Since the adoption of
Rule 5, two cases have ignored the Rule and have followed the
Taylor case in allowing the trial court to entertain and overrule
a motion filed after the ten-day period prescribed by Rule 330
(k).64 Neither of these cases has a writ of error history. In the
recent case of A. F. Jones & Sons v. Republic Supply Co.65 the
supreme court applied Rule 5 to a case appealed from a county
court. Judgment in that case was entered on January 30, 1951,
and no motion for new trial was filed during the two-day period
allowed by Rule 320. Thereafter, before expiration of the term,
the trial court entertained and overruled a belated motion for new
trial. The question on appeal was whether the time for filing an
appeal bond could date from the day the belated motion was
overruled. Applying Rule 5, the court held that "the trial court's
inherent power resides only in the right of altering its former
judgment and since it does not have the power on its own initiative
to extend the period for appellate procedure, neither does it have
the power to grant leave to file and then overrule a tardy motion
621 d. at 320, 77 S. W. 2d at 1034.
68 Senter v. Shanafelt, 233 S. W. 2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; Kilian v. Kilian,
185 S. W. 2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) ; Christner v. Mayer, 123 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938) er. dism. judgm. cor.
64 Senter v, Shanafelt and Kilian v. Kilian, supra note 63.
65 ........ Tex, .... 246 S. W. 2d 853 (1952).
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for new trial. "" This case was decided under the general prac-
tice, but there seems to be no reason why the same rule should not
apply to procedure under the Special Practice Act, since Rule 5
is equally applicable in both instances. For this reason it is be-
lieved that the two cases which ignored Rule 5 will not be fol-
lowed, and that a belated motion filed after the ten-day period
allowed by Rule 330 (k) will have no effect to extend the period
during which the trial court has control over the judgment or to
extend the period for complying with the other steps in appellate
procedure.
In some of the early cases there was often difficulty in deter-
mining when to start counting the ten-day period. The difficulty
arose chiefly in those cases in which a motion for new trial was
filed prior to the time the judgment was rendered. This difficulty
was eliminated by the adoption in 1946 of Rule 306c. This
Rule provides that motions for new trial filed prematurely "shall
be deemed to have been filed on the date of but subsequent to
the rendition of the judgment the motion assails... " If the judg-
ment is rendered nunc pro tunc, the ten-day period for filing a
motion for new trial is measured from the date of rendition of the
nunc pro tunc judgment. s7
The provisions of the Special Practice Act for filing of a new
trial have no application to the filing of such a motion in a suit in
which citation was by publication."8 The time periods in such cases
are prescribed by Rule 329.
Amendment. Under the general practice, an amended motion
for new trial may be filed at any time during the term, provided
the court has not ruled upon the original motion. 9 Under the
Special Practice Act, Rule 330 (k) provides that "a motion for
new trial ... may be amended by leave of the court at any time
66 246 S. W. 2d at 855.
67 Rule 306b.
68 Hunsinger v. Boyd, 119 Tex. 182, 26 S. W. 2d 905 (1930) ; Gahagan v. Texas
& P. Ry., 231 S. W. 2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Smith v. Higginbotham, 112 S. W.
2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
69 4 McDoNALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE (1950) 1447; Rule 320(a).
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before it is acted on within twenty (20) days after it is filed."
Prior to the 1930 amendment to the Special Practice Act, the
courts had held that this provision was directory only and that
the motion for new trial could be amended so long as the court
had power over the judgment.7" The 1930 amendment did not
change the language of Rule 330 (k). It merely amended Rule
330 (j) to provide that motions and amended motions for new
trial must be presented within thirty days after the original motion
or amended motion is filed and must be determined within not
exceeding forty-five days after the original or amended motion is
filed. The only change in the previous wording was that the word
"shall" was changed to "must" in the two places indicated by the
italicized words. At first blush it is difficult to see how this change
is sufficient to bring about the result that the period for amend-
ment of the original motion is limited to twenty days from the
filing of the original motion, since the word "may" in Rule 330
(k) remains unchanged. But the court in the Taylor case, reason-
ing from the language of the emergency clause and the mandatory
language of the provision for presentation and determination, held
that the twenty-day period was mandatory. In the companion case
of Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Work7 Justice Greenwood was
even more emphatic in speaking of this requirement. He said that
an amended motion filed too late is of no effect and that no more
than one amended motion may be filed. This language has been
repeated in many later decisions.72
In discussing the amendment of motions for new trial, the court
in the Taylor case set out the following conditions upon which a
motion for new trial may be amended: "First, that leave of court
70 Cases cited supra note 54.
71124 Tex. 281, 77 S. W. 2d 1036 (1934).
72 Jordan v. Madison, 241 S. W. 2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; Bowman v. Traders
& General Ins. Co., 219 S. W. 2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref.; Erwin v. Welborn,
207 S. W. 2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. ref. n.r.e.; Traders & General Ins. Co. v.
Scott, 189 S. W. 2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) er. ref. w.o.m.; Tunstill v. Scott, 182
S. W. 2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) er. ref. w.o.m.; Freedman Packing Co. v. Harris,
160 S. W. 2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) er. ref. w.o.m.
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must be obtained; second, that it can be amended only before it
is acted upon; and, third, that the amendment must be made within
20 days after the filing of the motion.'73 Regarding the first re-
quirement, the supreme court in the case of W. C. Turnbow Pe-
troleum Corporation v. Fulton7' said that "an amended pleading
or motion filed without first obtaining leave [of court] is not
always to be treated as of no effect whatever."75 The court held
that the effect of the trial court's order overruling the amended
motion for new trial was to determine that the movant was entitled
to file the amended motion, or thus, after the motion was filed,
to give permission for its filing. But an amended motion which
has never been ruled upon may not furnish a basis for appeal
unless it appears that leave to file the amended motion was
granted by the trial court.76
Of all the provisions of the Special Practice Act, the require-
ment that an amended motion be filed within 20 days following the
filing of the original motion has probably been the one causing
most difficulty. Ordinarily, the filing of an original motion for new
trial is a mere formality, the grounds of error alleged usually
being quite general. It is the amended motion which contains all
the errors the movant relies upon in his attempt to obtain a new
trial or to obtain a reversal in the appellate courts. Because of
the importance of this amended motion, the litigant desires an
opportunity to examine the record of the trial thoroughly and to
brief the points involved in order to be certain that his rights on
appeal are preserved.77 This process may require considerable
time, especially if there is any delay in obtaining the statement of
facts from the court reporter. In complex cases in which the record
73 124 Tex. at 321, 77 S. W. 2d at 1034.
74 145 Tex. 56, 194 S. W. 2d 256 (1946).
7 Id. at 61, 194 S. W. 2d at 258.
76 Combined American Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 214 S. W. 2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
77 "The grace period allowed-the right to file an amended motion-is to give the
losing party time to prepare his appeal; to investigate the facts and the law in order
to present to the trial court his grounds of error." Richmond v. Champagne's Bakery,
118 S. W. 2d 493, 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) er. ref.
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is lengthy, the twenty-day period allowed may be insufficient. And
yet there is nothing that the parties or the courts may do. The trial
court is without power to extend the time in which the motion
for new trial may be amended.7" The parties may not even by
agreement extend the period for amendment. Apparently the only
remedy is to delay rendition of the judgment until it appears that
the statement of facts will be available. It appears that this prac-
tice is being followed in some courts, but even here there are
instances in which the litigant just does not have sufficient time
in which to prepare an adequate motion.
Presentation. Under the general practice, a motion for new trial
is overruled by operation of law at the end of the term if it has
not been presented and decided before the term expires.79 Under
the Special Practice Act, Rule 330 (j) provides that "all motions
and amended motions for new trials must be presented within
thirty (30) days after the original motion or amended motion is
filed... " This requirement for presentation within thirty days
after the filing of the original or amended motion is mandatory
and may not be extended by order of the court or by agreement
of the parties."0 If the requirement is not met, the motion is over-
ruled by operation of law thirty days after the original or amended
motion is filed.9'
In this area the chief controversy seems to revolve around the
meaning of the word "presented." A recent civil appeals decision
held that the motion had been presented when the court entered
an order "passing" the cause at the request of the movant, when
78 Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilkirson, 124 Tex. 312, 77 S. W. 2d 1035 (1934) ;
Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Scott, 189 S. W. 2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) er. ref.
w.o.m. Rule 5 grants the trial court authority to extend the time for many procedural
steps, but provides that "it may not enlarge the period for taking any action under
the rules relating to new trials ... except as stated in the rules relating thereto. ..
79 Rule 320 (d) ; Fitzgerald v. Lane, 137 Tex. 514, 155 S. W. 2d 602 (1941).
80 Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Work, 124 Tex. 281, 77 S. W. 2d 1036 (1934);
Richmond v. Champagne's Bakery, 149 S. W. 2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) er. dism.
judgm. cor.
81 Thomas v. Murphy, 125 Tex. 105, 81 S. W. 2d 59 (1935) ; Dallas Storage & Ware-
house Co. v. Taylor, 124 Tex. 315, 77 S. W. 2d 1031 (1934).
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the only matter pending was the motion for new trial.8 2 On the
other hand, the Subcommittee on Interpretation of the Rules of
Civil Procedure has indicated that the presentation must be un-
qualified and without reservation. 8 Probably the best decision on
the matter is that in the recent case of Texas Livestock Marketing
Assn. v. Rogers, 4 decided by the San Antonio Court of Civil
Appeals in 1951. The opinion contains a thorough discussion of
the problem and indicates that a liberal construction of the word
to favor the right of appeal should be given. "When an attorney
for the party appealing files his motion or amended motion for a
new trial and calls it to the attention of the trial court, and informs
him that he is ready to present it for the court's action, he has
done about all that he can do."8 5 After the motion has been pre-
sented without qualification or reservation within the thirty-day
period, the court may after the expiration of the thirty-day period
hear argument and consider authorities in support or denial of
the motion. 6 But if evidence must be presented, as in a motion for
new trial on the ground of jury misconduct, the evidence must be
presented within the thirty-day period and may not be presented
thereafter.
Once there has been an unqualified presentation within the
thirty-day period, the court has until forty-five days after filing of
the original or amended motion in which to decide the motion.
8 7
But if there has been no presentation of the motion within the
prescribed thirty-day period, the motion is overruled by operation
of law at the expiration of the thirty-day period. 8
Decision. Rule 330 (j) provides that "all motions and amended
82 Cohen v. Cohen, 194 S. W. 2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
88 Interpretations Subcommittee Opinion, 5 Tex. B. J. 427 (1942), 8 Tex. B. J. 26
(1945).
84 244 S. W. 2d 859, er. rel. n.r.e.
85 Id. at 861.
86 The appellate court may consider supplemental evidence of presentation on
appeal. Smith v. Basham, 227 S. W. 2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), ag'd, . Tex.
__ 233 S. W. 2d 297 (1950).
87 Rule 330 (j).
85 Dallas Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Taylor, 124 Tex. 315, 77 S. W. 2d 1031 (1934).
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motions for new trials.., must be determined within not exceeding
forty-five (45) days after the original or amended motion is filed,
unless by written agreement of the parties in the case, the decision
of the motion is postponed to a later date." As the language of
the Rule indicates, this requirement is mandatory in the absence
of the written agreement provided for, and the court may not,
without the prescribed agreement, extend the time for determina-
tion of the motion. 9 If the motion has been timely presented but
has not been decided within the forty-five day period, the motion
is overruled by operation of law at the expiration of that period.90
The rule provides for extension of the time for deciding the
motion by written agreement of the parties. To be effective the
agreement must be one for postponement of the determination of
the motion; the time for amendment or presentation of the motion
may not be so extended.9' Further, the agreement to be effective
must be in writing92 and must extend the date for decision for a
definite period; a mere agreement waiving the 45-day requirement
will not suffice. 3 If no definite period is prescribed, the agreement
is of no effect, and the motion is overruled by operation of law
at the expiration of the forty-five day period after filing.94 Even
where the extension is for a fixed period, if the motion is not deter-
mined within that period, it is overruled by operation of law at
the expiration of the extended period.95
The time periods set out for determining when a judgment is
"final," when the appeal bond must be filed, and when the tran-
89 Highland Farms Corp. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 125 Tex. 474, 82 S. W. 2d 627 (1935).
90 Dallas Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Taylor, 124 Tex. 315, 77 S. W. 2d 1031 (1934) ;
Donnelly v. Donnelly, 241 S. W. 2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; Gillespie v. Rossi, 238
S. W. 2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref. n.r.e.
91 Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Work, 124 Tex. 281, 77 S. W. 2d 1036 (1934);
Alexander Mtr. Co. v. Pruitt, 198 S. W. 2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) er. ref.
92 An oral agreement is insufficient. Jones v. Campbell, 188 S. W. 2d 679 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945) er. ref.
9' Pierce v. Loyd, 131 Tex. 401, 114 S. W. 2d 867 (1938) ; Highland Farms Corp.
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 125 Tex. 474, 82 S. W. 2d 627 (1935).
94 Pierce v. Loyd, supra note 93.
99 Highland Farms Corp. v. Fidelity Trust Co., cited supra note 93; Greer v. Poulter,
189 S. W. 2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) er. ref. w.o.m.
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script and statement of facts must be filed are all measured from
the date of judgment or from the date an original or amended
motion for new trial is overruled. A motion for new trial may be
expressly overruled by order of the court, or it may be overruled
by operation of law. In either event, the legal consequences are
the same, so that matters presented in a motion for new trial which
is overruled by operation of law may still furnish a basis for
appeal even though never expressly passed upon by the trial
court.96 Even after a motion for new trial has been overruled,
whether by order of the court or by operation of law the court
still has control of the judgment and power to grant a new trial
until the expiration of 30 days from the date on which the motion
was overruled.97
(3) PERFECTING THE APPEAL
The Special Practice Act has no provisions for perfecting an
appeal, the rules for district and county courts generally pre-
vailing.9" But because of the close relationship of the perfection
of appeal to the matters which are governed by the Special Prac-
tice Act, a consideration of the requirements is given herein.
Notice of Appeal. The first step in perfecting the appeal is by
giving notice of appeal. It was formerly required that such notice
of appeal be given in open court within two days following rendi-
tion of judgment. Rule 353 now provides that notice of appeal
may be given "(1) in open court, noted on the docket or embodied
in the judgment, order overruling motion for new trial, or other
minute of the court, or (2) filed with the clerk." The notice in
either instance must be given or filed within ten days after the
judgment or order overruling motion for new trial is rendered.
Under the Special Practice Act, this provision operates to require
notice of appeal whenever there is no motion for new trial, or
96 Christner v. Mayer, 123 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
97 Dallas Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Taylor, 124 Tex. 315, 77 S. W. 2d 1031 (1934) ;




when the motion for new trial is expressly overruled by the trial
court. This requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal
and cannot be waived.9 But when the motion or amended motion
for new trial is overruled by operation of law, either by failure to
present within the prescribed time or failure to have the motion
determined within the required period, no notice of appeal is
required.00 Notice of appeal is not required when appeal is taken
from an interlocutory order.
1 1
Cost Bond. The second step in perfecting the appeal is the
execution of a bond for costs of appeal. Rule 354 prescribes the
requirements of the bond, and a note to the Rule lists those cases
in which the appellant is exempted from filing a bond. Whenever
a bond is required, it must be filed within thirty days after the
date of rendition of judgment or the order overruling a motion
for new trial.0 2 When the motion or amended motion for new
trial is overruled by operation of law, the time for filing the
appeal bond is measured from the date the motion is overruled
by operation of law.0 8 When the appellant files an affidavit in
lieu of bond, it must be filed not more than twenty days after the
date of rendition of the judgment or order overruling motion for
new trial.0 4 Where used, a supersedeas bond has the same effect
as an appeal bond, so that if it is filed within the period pre-
scribed for the filing of the appeal bond, the jurisdictional require-
ment is met.' 5 Appeals from interlocutory orders are governed
by Rule 385. In such appeals, the appeal bond or supersedeas
bond must be filed within twenty days after the order appealed
from is entered.
The importance of a timely filing of the appeal bond cannot be
99 4 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE (1950) 1505 and cases cited therein.
100 Houston Life Ins. Co. v. Dabbs, 125 Tex. 100, 81 S. W. 2d 42 (1935) ; Combined
American Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 207 S. W. 2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
101 Walker v. Cleere, 141 Tex. 550, 174 S. W. 2d 956 (1943).
102 Rule 356 (a).
103 Thomas v. Murphy, 125 Tex. 105, 81 S. W. 2d 59 (1935).
104 Rule 356 (b) ; Hubbard v. Faulks, 159 S. W. 2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
105 Garvin v. Hufft, 243 S. W. 2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref. n.r.e.
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overemphasized. Timely filing is a jurisdictional requirement,
prerequisite to the acquisition of jurisdiction by the court of civil
appeals.10 8 Furthermore, the time periods prescribed by the rules
for filing the appeal bond may not be extended either by the trial
court or by the court of civil appeals. °7 Most of the questions
concerning the operation of the Special Practice Act arise on a
motion by the appellee to dismiss the appeal because of lack of
jurisdiction due to failure to file the appeal bond within the pre-
scribed period.
Transcript and Statement of Facts. Rule 363 provides that "the
appeal is perfected when the notice of appeal is given and the
bond or affidavit in lieu thereof has been filed. . .." However,
Rule 386 provides that "the appellant shall file the transcript and
statement of facts with the clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals
within sixty days from the rendition of the final judgment or order
overruling motion for new trial. . . ." This requirement has been
held to be jurisdictional, so that even if the notice of appeal and
appeal bond have been timely filed, the court of civil appeals may
still be unable to act if the transcript and statement of facts are
not filed within the 60-day period required.' When the appellant
files the transcript within the prescribed time, but is late in filing
the statement of facts, the absence of the latter does not affect the
right to appeal, but merely limits the extent of review by prevent-
ing the consideration of assignments of error based upon matters
that should appear in the statement of facts."0 9
The Rule makes provision that if the appellant "by motion filed
106 Walker v. Cleere, 141 Tex. 550, 174 S. W. 2d 956 (1943); Barnes v. Raymer,
224 S. W. 2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Alexander Mtr. Co. v,. Pruitt, 198 S. W. 2d
947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) er. ref.
107 Garvin v. Hufft, cited supra note 105. In Masterson v. Bingham, 84 S. W. 2d 295
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935) er. ref., a motion to dismiss the appeal was granted because of
lack of jurisdiction even though the appellate court had already heard the appeal and
had reversed and rendered judgment for the appellant.
10 Donnelly v. Donnelly, 241 S. W. 2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; Tunstill v. Scott,
182 S. W. 2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) er. ref. w.o.m.
109 Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lane, 240 S. W. 2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), rev'd on other
grounds -........... Tex - ....... 243 S. W. 2d 683 (1951).
[Vol. 6
SPECIAL PRACTICE ACT
before, at, or within a reasonable time, not exceeding fifteen days
after the expiration of such sixty-day period, ... [shows] good
cause to have existed within such sixty-day period why said tran-
script and statement of facts could not be so filed, the Court of
Civil Appeals may permit the same to be thereafter filed upon such
terms as it shall prescribe."
The usual procedure to follow whenever the transcript and
statement of facts are noi filed within the required time is for the
appellee to make a motion to affirm on certificate under the pro.
visions of Rule 387.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
An attorney in a court whose procedure is governed by the
Special Practice Act must observe carefully the time periods pre-
scribed therein in order to preserve the right of appeal. It seems
fundamental that he should be able to know at any time whether
the court in which he is practicing is subject to the provisions of
the Act. In a matter as basic as this, there is no reason why there
should ever be any doubt about its applicability. Yet the large
number of cases in which the question has been raised indicates
that such doubt does exist. Even after a review of all the cases,
the status of such counties as Panola, Shelby and Navarro re-
mains in doubt. As recently as November, 1951, the Galveston
Court of Civil Appeals certified a question to the supreme court
asking whether the district courts of Galveston County were subject
to the Act,"1 despite the fact that Rule 330 had been in effect for
ten years.
The primary reason for the existence of doubt is the fact that
Article 199 contains so many widely varying provisions for terms
of court. A further reason is that some courts deciding early cases
did so without consideration of some of the problems involved,
and later courts have felt bound by these decisions.
The most desirable solution to this problem is for the Texas
11o Bunte v. Flett, __. Tex. 243 S. W. 2d 828 (1951).
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Legislature to provide for continuous terms in all district courts
throughout the state. Such a solution would bring the advantages
of continuous terms to all district courts and would achieve uni-
formity throughout the state. Even if this suggestion is not adopted,
it is believed that portions of Article 199 should be amended to
make it clear whether or not they constitute provisions for con-
tinuous terms.
One problem which the courts have heretofore brushed off may
return to plague them. Consider a situation in which a court in a
county such as Kaufman, which had been held to operate under the
Special Practice Act, adjourns a term more than two days prior
to the date fixed for the beginning of the next term. When the
succeeding term begins in the same year, is the court operating
under the Special Practice Act? Rule 330 requires successive
terms throughout the year without more than two days inter-
vening between any of such terms. A literal application of this
requirement would require that the Special Practice Act be held
inapplicable in this situation. On the other hand, the courts in their
decisions have laid little or no stress on whether the terms actually
were continuous, and have merely looked to the appropriate sub-
division of Article 199 to determine whether the terms might be
continuous. It is apparent that such a situation could make it
extremely difficult for an attorney to know for certain which set
of procedural rules to follow. One possible solution for this
situation would be to amend Rule 19 to provide that when
the statute sets no fixed date for the end of the term of a district
court, the term shall end on the date fixed for the beginning of
the next succeeding term, and the judge shall have no power to
adjourn the term prior to that date.
In the discussion of the provisions relating to the filing of
amended motions for new trial, it was noted that the time allowed
by Rule 330 may be insufficient in complex cases, especially when
there is delay in getting the statement of facts from the court
reporter. Under the general practice, the district courts are em-
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powered to extend the term to allow additional time for amend-
ment of motions for new trial. Yet in the courts operating under
the Special Practice Act, in which most of the litigation in the
state arises, no such power exists. It is believed that Rule 5
should be amended to allow the trial court, for good cause shown,
to extend the period for the filing of an amended motion for new
trial.
The situation in which a trial begins in one term, continues
through a second, and is still not completed at the expiration of
the second term has been discussed. The Ripy case held that such
a trial could not be continued without extension of the second
term. It is believed that this case is an incorrect interpretation of
Rule 330 (j) and that it should be overruled by the supreme
court at its first opportunity. Amendment of Rule 330, to leave
no doubt that the trial can be be continued into a third term,
is another possibility.
The Special Practice Act was adopted for the purpose of expe-
diting litigation in courts with crowded dockets. It is believed
that the suggestions made herein are consistent with that purpose.
Rules of procedure are intended as means to an end-the orderly
disposition of litigation. The changes suggested herein would do
much to bring certainty into a field of law about which there
should be no uncertainty.
APPENDIX
The following tables contain a listing of the counties in which
it is believed that the Special Practice Act is applicable and those
in which the general practice is followed. There is no difficulty in
classifying most of the counties, especially those in which the term
provisions are identical with provisions already construed as con-
tinuous terms. Others which have not been construed present some
difficulties. Footnotes refer to discussions of some of the problems
involved in determining whether specific counties are under the
Special Practice Act. Further clouding the picture is the problem
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of whether a particular court would be held to be under the Special
Practice Act if the judge should adjourn the term more than two
days before the beginning of the next term. As to this point see the
discussion supra at page 222.
COUNTIES UNDER THE SPECIAL PRACTICE ACT
Anderson Coryell Hardin Lubbock
Andrews Cottle Harris Lynn
Angelina Crane Harrison Madison
Aransas Crockett Hartley Marion
Archer Crosby Haskell Martin
Armstrong Dallam Hays Mason
Atascosa Dallas Hemphill Matagorda
Austin Dawson Henderson Maverick
Bailey Deaf Smith Hockley McCullough
Bandera Denton Hood McLennan
Bastrop DeWitt Houston McMullen
Baylor Dickens Howard Medina
Bee Dimmitt Hutchinson Menard -
Bell Donley Jack Midland
Bexar Duval Jackson Milam
Blanco Eastland Jasper Mills
Borden Ector Jefferson Mitchell
Bosque Edwards Jim Hogg Montague
Brazoria Ellis Jim Wells Moore
Brazos Erath Johnson Morris
Briscoe Falls Karnes Motley
Brooks Fannin Kaufman Nacogdoches
Brown Fayette Kendall Navarro
1 12
Burleson Floyd Kenedy Newton
Burnet Fort Bend Kent Nolan
Caldwell Franklin"'l Kerr Nueces
Calhoun Freestone Kimble Ochiltree
Cameron Frio King Oldham
Camp Gaines Kinney Orange
Carson Galveston Kleberg Palo Pinto
Castro Garza Knox Panola"
2
Chambers Gillespie Lamar"1 ' Parker
Cherokee Glasscock Lamb Parmer
Childress Goliad Lampasas Potter
Clay Gonzales LaSalle Randall
Cochran Gray Lavaca Real
Coleman Grayson Lee Reeves
Collin Gregg Leon Refugio
Collingsworth Grimes Liberty Roberts
Colorado Guadalupe Limestone Robertson
Comal Hale Lipscomb Rockwall
Comanche Hall Live Oak Runnels
Concho Hamilton Llano Rusk
Cooke Hansford Loving
1I See text at p. 203.
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